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INTRODUCTION
Trademark law is confused. At common law and under the Lanham Act, trademark holders must deal with outdated rules about territoriality. At common law, different owners may use similar marks as long as these marks are used in geographically remote areas. 1 Because of this, courts analyzing a common law trademark tend to first determine whether two marks are used in non-remote locations, and then proceed to undergo an infringement analysis, i.e., the likelihood of confusion test. 2 If the marks are used remotely, then the court stops the inquiry without looking to likelihood of confusion.
So too under the Lanham Act. Due to the Dawn Donut rule, a senior user is unable to receive an injunction if a junior has used the mark in an area that is remote from the senior. 3 Like the common law, this doctrine is premised on the notion that consumers will not be confused by similar marks used in different areas. 4 However, despite its claims about confusion, this inquiry is entirely separate from the infringement analysis. Thus, whether the common law or Lanham Act controls, a trademark holder still must separate the infringement analysis from the question of territoriality.
This process is unnecessarily longwinded. Under both common law and statutory law, consumer confusion fuels trademark territoriality. As one judge emphasized, likelihood of confusion serves as a "touchstone" when determining the trade area. 5 As such, this paper will demonstrate that confusion should frame the entire inquiry. There is no need to undergo a separate territoriality analysis if a court determines that consumers are likely to be confused. Because the whole goal of territoriality is to prevent consumer confusion, likelihood of confusion alone should establish a prima facie of trademark infringement sufficient to enjoin the junior user.
At first glance, this may seem like an unimportant issue. After all, what harm is incurred by the application of excess tests, besides a bit of inefficiency? As it turns out, trademark territoriality is not just beset with redundancy; it actively undermines what it seeks to protect. When trademark rights are limited to geographic areas where the owner presently operates, then it is possible that consumers outside that area will be confused. Consider consumers who are exposed to a mark on the Internet or consumers who are familiar with a company's mark in one area and travel to a remote area where a different company uses the mark. In the modern age, fixating on geographic proximity leaves these entire groups of consumers, Internet users, and travelers unprotected from confusingly similar marks-and such consumers are hardly a minority. Thus, it is a mistake to condition trademark rights on geographic proximity. Instead, the likelihood of confusion analysis must be the end-all-be-all. If consumers in an area are likely to be confused, then the first to use the mark should have trademark rights in that area, whether or not they actually operate there. 3. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1959) . 4. See id. 5. All Video, Inc. v. Hollywood Entm't. Corp., 929 F. Supp. 262, 266 (E.D. Mich. 1996) . Part I of this paper lays out the doctrinal background of territoriality and trademark law, focusing on the similarities and differences between common law and federal statutory law. Then, Part II sets out to show that confusion underlies trademark territoriality both at common law and under the Lanham Act. With this demonstrated, Part III illustrates the pitfalls of conceptualizing territoriality as separate from the concern of confusion, specifically with regards to the Internet and mass travel. Because of this, Part IV offers a simple solution that merges the likelihood of confusion test with the traditional territoriality doctrine.
I. TERRITORIALITY IN TRADEMARK LAW
A. Concurrent Use at Common Law
In Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, the Supreme Court created a seemingly simple rule: trademark rights are obtained only through use. 6 In other words, merely conceiving of a mark is insufficient to grant someone a legal right to that mark. If one is to acquire trademark rights, she must be the "first to use a mark on a product or service." 7 Simple enough. But, as the Ninth Circuit has aptly noted, things get a bit more complicated "when to time we add considerations of place." 8 In United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus, the Supreme Court added that one must not just be the first in time to use a mark, but she must also be the first to use the mark in a specific place. 9 The principles from Hanover Star and Theodore Rectanus form the basis for the common law concurrent use doctrine: similar marks may be used in remote geographic areas by good faith users, and if the area of use overlaps, exclusive rights belong to the first user. 10 Thus, for a junior user to adopt a mark similar to that of a senior user, the junior must show that her use is (1) remote, and (2) in good faith. For our purposes, the requirement of good faith will be discussed later in this paper, and remoteness will be the focus of this section. 6. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916) . 7. Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Cmty. Coll. Dist., 889 F.2d 1018 , 1023 (11th Cir. 1989 ). 8. Grupo Gigante S.A. de C. V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088 , 1093 (9th Cir. 2004 ). 9. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100 (1918) . 10. See id. This is also called the "Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine," but in this paper it will exclusively be referred to as the "concurrent use doctrine."
Remoteness is determined in one of two ways. First, trademark rights are typically limited to a mark's "zone of actual goodwill." 11 Second, even if a mark has no actual goodwill in an area, courts have found that trademark rights extend to a "zone of natural expansion." 12
Zone of Actual Goodwill
The zone of actual goodwill is divided into two categories: the mark's zone of market penetration and zone of reputation. 13 The zone of market penetration is the most common indicator of actual goodwill. This zone is equivalent to all areas where the mark holder does a sufficient amount of business. In Sweetarts v. Sunline, the Eighth Circuit devised one of the earlier tests to determine the scope of market.
14 This test instructed courts to weigh the following factors (1) total dollar value of plaintiff's sales in the market; (2) number of actual customers in relation to the region's population; (3) sales growth, both relative and potential; and (4) length of time since significant sales. 15 The Third Circuit reshaped these factors in Natural Footwear Ltd. v. Hart to create its own test for market penetration. 16 This test involves weighing the following factors (1) amount of sales involving the trademark; (2) positive and negative growth trends in the geographical area; (3) number of purchasing customers in relation to the total number of potential customers; and (4) amount of advertising in the geographical area. 17 Multiple other circuits have embraced the Natural Footwear factors, and thus this test is the more common of the two. 18 If a mark holder passes this balancing test, then she is deemed to have "penetrated" the market such that she has made actual use there.
In contrast, the zone of reputation exists in all geographical regions where the mark is merely recognized, regardless of whether the mark holder 11. See Thomas F. Cotter, Owning What Doesn't Exist, Where It Doesn't Exist: Rethinking Two Doctrines from the Common Law of Trademarks, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 487, 492 (1995 .
12. Spartan Food Sys. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279 , 1283 (4th Cir. 1987 REV. 1075 , 1110 -12 (1990 ). 14. 380 F.2d 923, 929 (8th Cir. 1967 ). 15. Id. 16. Nat. Footwear, Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383 , 1398 -99 (3d Cir. 1985 . 17. Id. 18. See, e.g., Allard Enters. v. Advanced Programming Res., Inc., 249 F.3d 564, 574 (6th Cir. 2001 ); Adray v. Adry-Mart, Inc., 76 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir. 1995); Spartan, 813 F.2d at 1283. has made actual use there. 19 An early illustration of the zone of reputation is found in Stork Restaurant v. Sahati. 20 In Stork, the appellant owned and operated a night club in New York called THE STORK CLUB, which had reached nationwide fame due to widescale advertising and media presence. 21 After the New York club had been in operation for sixteen years, the appellees opened its bar in San Francisco under the name THE STORK CLUB. 22 The trial court refused to issue an injunction, but the Ninth Circuit found that "mere geographical distance is not of itself sufficient to preclude the possibility that a given establishment is a branch of an enterprise having its principal place of business elsewhere." 23 Because of this, the court of appeals remanded the case with directions to the trial court to grant the injunction. 24 Therefore, although the two marks were used across the country from one another, these uses were certainly not "remote" in the sense of concurrent use under Theodore Rectanus. 25 The zone of reputation thus aligns with the central thrust of this paper: two marks can confuse consumers despite geographical distance.
Zone of Natural Expansion
As the name of this doctrine implies, some courts extend the rights of trademark owners to areas where the use of the mark might "naturally expand." 26 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1959) ("[I] f the use of the marks by the registrant and the unauthorized user are confined to two sufficiently distinct and geographically separate markets, with no likelihood that the registrant will expand his use into defendant's market, so that no public confusion is possible, then the registrant is not entitled to enjoin the junior user's use of the mark." of Customs and Patent Appeals (now the Federal Circuit) looks to (1) "previous business activity;" (2) "previous expansion or lack thereof;" (3) "dominance of contiguous areas;" (4) "presently-planned expansion;" and (5) "possible market penetration by means of products brought in from other areas." 27 The Eleventh Circuit looks to similar factors. 28 Other courts have foregone the multi-factor tests for a more fact-specific inquiry. 29 Nevertheless, under any analysis, most circuits tend to use a few recurring factors: the history of expansions, the size of the business, and the amount of business activity in the contested area. These are concrete pieces of evidence to which the mark holder must point; she cannot simply refer to her aspirations of expansion. 30 But if a mark holder can adequately demonstrate a zone of natural expansion, then she can acquire trademark rights before making actual use in an area.
B. Territoriality and the Lanham Act
Territoriality also plays a misguided role under the all-encompassing Lanham Act, which governs the federal trademark registration process. The Lanham Act took effect on July 5, 1947. 31 In 2016, there were over two million registered trademarks in the United States. 32 Although it is impossible to accurately quantify the number of common law trademarks in the United States, it is probably safe to assume that trademarks registered 27. Weiner King, Inc. v. Wiener King Corp., 615 F.2d 512, 523 (C.C.P.A. 1980) . This test has been adopted by the Third and Fourth Circuits. See Spartan Food Sys. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279 , 1283 (4th Cir. 1987 ; see also Nat. Footwear, Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383 , 1398 (3d Cir. 1985 .
28. Tally-Ho, 889 F.2d at 1028 (looking to (1) the geographical distance from the user's actual location to the perimeter of the zone of expansion; (2) the nature of the business and the size of the zone of market penetration/reputation; (3) the history of the user's past expansion, i.e. whether it has remained static or has continued to expand into new areas, and based on this, the length of time it would take the user to reach the periphery of the expansion zone; and (4) whether it would require an unusual leap for the user to enter the zone, or instead whether the zone is close enough to existing locations that expansion is a logical extension as those previously made).
29. The Value House v. Phillips Mercantile Co., 523 F.2d 424, 431 (10th Cir. 1975 ) (looking at the history of expansion and business activity in the contested area); Shoppers Fair of Ark., Inc. v. Sanders Co., 328 F.2d 496, 500-01 (8th Cir. 1964 ) (focusing on the location of current stores and testimony regarding planned expansions); Burger King of Fla., Inc. v. Brewer, 244 F. Supp. 293, 298-99 (W.D. Tenn. 1965 ) (analyzing the "growth, size and location" of the business generally and the amount of activity in at the contested area under the Lanham Act comprise the lion's share of trademarks in the United States.
An Age of Federal Registrations
The Lanham Act grants the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") the authority to issue concurrent use registrations to different parties so long as the Director of the PTO determines that "confusion, mistake, or deception is not likely to result from the continued use" by multiple parties. 33 When a concurrent registration is issued, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ("TTAB") creates conditions and limitations regarding the mode or place of use. 34 Registration under the Lanham Act confers upon the registrant nationwide trademark rights based on "constructive use," regardless of where the registrant actually uses the mark. 35 Furthermore, registration of a mark on the principal register provides "constructive notice" of the registrant's ownership. 36 So, a junior user under the Lanham Act cannot invoke the concurrent use doctrine because her use is neither remote nor in good faith. 37 Nevertheless, a party who has used the mark before the registration can still retain her trademark rights. 38 To do so, Section 1115(b)(5) of the Lanham Act requires a party to show that she adopted the mark before the registration, without knowledge of the registrant's prior use, and that she has continuously used the mark in a specified area. 39 Upon such a showing, this prior user is "frozen" to its area of use prior to the federal registration.
At first glance, the prior user's ability to continue using her mark in the face of registration seems to be a codification of the common law concurrent 42 The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, has read the remoteness requirement from the common law into the limited area defense. 43 Given this disagreement, it would be hasty to interpret Section 1115(b)(5) as a perfect codification of the concurrent use doctrine. Thus, for our purposes, we will treat them as distinct doctrines. As far as remedies go, the Lanham Act confers upon the registrant the right to a civil cause of action against an infringer 44 and further entitles her to injunctive relief. 45 However, the mere act of infringement does not necessarily grant the registrant the right to enjoin the infringing use. The following section will detail the territorial limits of the injunction.
Injunctions and the Dawn Donut Rule
In 1959, the Second Circuit created a rule that seemed to flow naturally from the concurrent use doctrine: plaintiffs cannot enjoin remote users from using the plaintiff's mark. 46 Starting in June of 1922, the eponymous plaintiff in Dawn Donut adopted the mark DAWN DONUT to use in connection with the sale of donut mix. 47 Dawn Donut was a Michigan-based company that sold its mix to buyers in several states across the country, including New York. 48 The defendant, Hart Food Stores, owned and operated a retail grocery chain within several New York counties. 49 In 1951, Hart Food began to use the mark DAWN in connection with the sale of baked goods within a forty-five mile radius of Rochester, New York. 50 The district court found that Hart Food had adopted the mark in good faith and without actual knowledge 40. I have labeled this a "response" instead of a defense because there is disagreement as to whether this is a defense on the merits or whether it simply eliminates the benefits of incontestability. of the plaintiff's use. 51 But because the plaintiff had federally registered its mark in 1927, when the Lanham Act came into effect on July 5, 1947, the defendant was held to have constructive notice of the mark. 52 As such, the defendant was unable to claim that it was engaged in good faith use. Thus, it looked like the plaintiff had won. After all, the concurrent use defense is inapplicable without good faith. Yet, this did not end the inquiry. The court ultimately concluded that a senior user is not entitled to enjoin a junior user if the two users "are confined to two sufficiently distinct and geographically separate markets, with no likelihood that the registrant will expand his use into defendant's market, so that no public confusion is possible." 53 In the case at hand, the district court found that since 1927, Dawn Donut had not licensed its mark in connection with the sale of donuts within sixty miles of Hart Food's trading area. 54 Furthermore, although the plaintiff had made sales to bakers in Rochester, none of the purchasers sold donuts in connection with the plaintiff's mark. 55 As such, the district court concluded that Dawn Donut neither used its mark in the defendant's trading area nor had any intent to expand the use of its mark to the area. 56 The Second Circuit, therefore, held that Dawn Donut and the defendant used their marks in "distinct and separate markets," and because of this, Dawn Donut could not enjoin the defendant's use. 57 Dawn Donut has gained popularity across circuits, and courts tend to apply the doctrine in roughly the same way: to acquire injunctive relief, the plaintiff must either have entered the geographical area of the defendant or have plans to expand there. 58 v. Schell & Kampeter, Inc., 41 F.3d 1242 , 1246 (8th Cir. 1994 ("[T] o enjoin a geographically remote infringer, the registered owner must prove that its trademarked products and the infringing products are being sold in the same geographic area, or that the owner has concrete plans to expand into the infringer's trade area."); Union Nat'l Bank v. Union Nat'l Bank, 909 F.2d 839, 843 (5th Cir. 1990 ) ("A senior user may not exclude others in areas where he does not currently do business nor is likely to do business in the future." (citing Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 364-65)); Mister Donut of Am., Inc. v. Donut, Inc., 418 F.2d 838, 844 (9th Cir. 1969) ("[W] here a federal registrant has expanded its business to the point that the use of the conflictingly similar marks by plays no role here due to constructive notice. 59 After Dawn Donut, courts tend to enjoin only based on actual use or an intent to expand. Thus, the Dawn Donut rule only concerns the plaintiff's zone of market penetration or zone of natural expansion, not her zone of reputation.
II. THE ROLE OF CONFUSION
The previous section detailed the doctrinal background of trademark territoriality, both at common law and under federal law. This is not the whole story, however. As indicated in the introduction, there is a common theme underlying all territoriality doctrine: confusion. As Dan Burk has argued, a junior user's claim of territorial rights in an area is roughly equivalent to a claim that consumers in that area are not likely to be confused. 60 In other words, because territorial rights are entirely premised on a lack of confusion, it is nonsensical to claim that consumers in an area are likely to confuse a senior and junior users' marks, and also conclude that the senior user has no territorial rights there. But a court that rigidly applies the zone of market penetration or expansion tests, and does not use the zone of reputation test, could fail to issue an injunction in an area where the senior user has a reputation without a physical presence. After all, Dawn Donut is entirely premised on actual use or expansion.
This section will show that trademark territoriality is grounded in an outdated notion of consumer awareness. It begins by looking at the reasoning courts employ when drawing territorial boundaries at common law. Then, it will look at courts' justification for the use of Dawn Donut under the Lanham Act. By looking at both territorial doctrines, this section will show that courts in both areas seem to be motivated almost entirely by consumer confusion. the registrant and the unauthorized user are no longer confined to separate and distinct market areas and there is established the likelihood of public confusion, the federal registrant is entitled under the authority of the Lanham Act to injunctive relief." (citing Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 365)).
59. Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 362 (" [B] y eliminating the defense of good faith and lack of knowledge, § 1072 affords nationwide protection to registered marks, regardless of the areas in which the registrant actually uses the mark."); see also Koffler Stores, Ltd. v. Shoppers Drug Mart, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 697, 702 (E.D. Mich. 1976 ) ("Once registration is effected, no subsequent adoption and use of the same or a similar mark for the same or similar goods can be justified on a claim of good faith.").
60. Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 695, 711 (1998) ("One might say that territorially separated concurrent users of a mark have developed rights within distinct areas, or that the consumers in the distinct areas are unlikely to become confused, but the statements are largely equivalent.").
A. Consumer Awareness at Common Law
First, return to the concurrent use doctrine. Even in Theodore Rectanus, which created the concurrent use doctrine, the reasoning of the Court suggests that the underlying concern was confusion. There, the Court stated that two marks are remote if a mark "means one thing in one market, [and] an entirely different thing in another." 61 The Court added that trademark law prevents two non-remote entities from making use of the same mark because of how "purchasers have come to understand the mark." 62 The Court's concern is clear: an individual cannot start using a mark similar to another mark in an area when consumers have come to understand the first mark in a certain way. If a junior user employs a mark with which consumers have already developed an association, then the Supreme Court would not deem this use "remote." This reasoning has led Professor McCarthy to remark that remoteness at common law is not about geographical distance, but is instead about the "territorial dimension of likelihood of confusion." 63 Even though territory is linked to confusion, the classic remoteness doctrine tends to treat geographical distance and consumer awareness distinctly. Think back to the zone of actual goodwill, which is divided into two subcategories: market penetration and reputation. The former is concerned with geographic remoteness, and the latter is concerned with consumer awareness. If Professor McCarthy is correct (which I believe he is), then market penetration is redundant; reputation is all that matters. But caselaw has gone the opposite way. In practice, it is uncommon for courts to use the zone of reputation in their territory analysis. Some courts have recognized it, 64 but many circuit courts have found that market penetration 61. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100 (1918) . 62. Id. 63. MCCARTHY, supra note 25, at § 26:4. 64. E.g., Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111 , 1124 (6th Cir. 1996 ("[M] ere geographical distance is not controlling where the reputation of the senior user's mark has been carried into a trade area prior to the junior user's adoption and use." (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing MCCARTHY, supra note 22, at § 26.06)); Peaches Entm't Corp. v. Entm't Repertoire Assocs., 62 F.3d 690, 693 (5th Cir. 1995) ("The junior user may establish his trade territory by identifying the 'zone of reputation' acquired for his mark. ("[G] eographic distance between parties will not preclude a finding of infringement or unfair competition alone determines remoteness. 65 Along these lines, some trademark scholars have suggested that the zone of reputation should entirely give way to the zone of penetration in determining actual goodwill, 66 or that the zone of reputation should merely be a factor among many. 67 This development would seem to suggest that Professor McCarthy and I are wrong in claiming that remoteness is about consumer awareness and not geography. Yet, upon closer inspection, courts commonly invoke market penetration while simultaneously grounding their inquiry in consumer awareness. Take, for example, the case of Accu Personnel, Inc. v. Accustaff, Inc. from the District of Delaware. 68 In Accu Personnel, the court held that concurrent use requires geographical remoteness, and thus neither party can penetrate the market of the other if concurrent use applies. 69 This holding was a straightforward application of the zone of market penetration, and perhaps the analysis could have ended there. However, the court went on to find that the trademark owner must establish market penetration sufficient to pose a likelihood of confusion. 70 So, despite the court's focus on actual market penetration, it appears that the underlying concern of the court was truly consumer confusion, not just the use in a geographical region. After all, if the court applied remoteness in its literal geographic sense, then any based upon a likelihood of confusion."); Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho, 437 F. Supp. 956, 962 (N.D. Cal. 1977 ) (issuing a nationwide injunction despite plaintiff's solely local use because of nationwide reputation); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Roberts, 388 F. Supp. 1383, 1387 (D.S.C. 1974) ("Although there is some evidence that the two restaurants do appeal to the same north-south tourist traffic, direct or market competition is not an essential ingredient of unfair competition; and plaintiffs need not establish competition in the same market.").
65. See, e.g., Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. Fire Eagle Engine Co., 332 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2003) (" [E] ven though the senior user of an unregistered mark has established priority over a junior user through prior appropriation, injunctive relief is appropriate only in those areas where the senior user can show sufficient actual use."); Nat'l Ass'n for Healthcare Commc'ns Inc. v. Cent. Ark. Area Agency on Aging, Inc., 257 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir. 2001) ("To be entitled to injunctive relief against [the defendant's] subsequent good faith use, [the plaintiff] must prove that its prior use of the mark penetrated the geographic market in question."); GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 542 (10th Cir. 1990 ) (finding that the use was remote because the plaintiff had never operated subsidiaries in the area, sold products or provided services in the area, nor advertised in the area); Nat. Footwear, Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383 , 1394 (3d Cir. 1985 ("[T] he senior user of a common law mark may not be able to obtain relief against the junior user in an area where it has no established trade, and hence no reputation and no good will.").
66. amount of market penetration would render two marks non-remote. However, the conclusion in Accu Personnel was not that simple. Instead, remoteness fades when consumers are sufficiently aware of both marks, or as the Supreme Court said, the marks no longer "mean one thing in one market" and "an entirely different thing in another." 71 Thus, although the inquiry seemed initially to be framed around geographic penetration, the separation between remoteness and confusion is merely illusory. The court in Accu Personnel is not the only court to claim it is using one test of remoteness when in fact it is using another. In National Ass'n for Healthcare Communities v. Central Arkansas Area Agency on Aging, Inc., the Eighth Circuit claimed to be focusing its remoteness inquiry on actual, physical market penetration. 72 Yet, in so doing, the court emphasized that the market penetration "must be significant enough to pose the real likelihood of confusion among the consumers" in the specified area. 73 Moreover, when applied to the facts at hand, the court determined that the plaintiff had not shown a likelihood of confusion in the defendant's area of use, and thus the plaintiff had not penetrated that territory. 74 Like the district court in Accu Personnel, the Eighth Circuit seems to understand market penetration to both mean penetration based on sales and penetration based on consumer awareness. By analyzing remoteness in this way, these courts have taken a subtle approach to ground the remoteness inquiry in confusion.
That being said, some courts explicitly define remoteness as an assessment of consumer awareness. 75 an area in which the senior user's mark was not known such that there would be confusion as to source." Similarly, in Best Cellars, Inc. v. Wine Made Simple, Inc., Judge Sweet used Theodore Rectanus to support his assertion that remoteness is a use in "an area where the senior user's mark was not known such that there could be confusion as to source." 77 The Fourth Circuit has embraced this interpretation of Theodore Rectanus and has endorsed this notion of remoteness. 78 To be sure, not all courts agree that geography and consumer awareness are two sides of the same coin. 79 Nevertheless, as these examples show, there are notable instances of courts openly embracing the confusion-based model of remoteness.
In sum, although some courts may be less than clear about the role of confusion in concurrent use at common law, there are plenty of examples that demonstrate courts generally recognize the interplay of remoteness and confusion. Although some courts reject this overlap, this paper is making a normative assertion, as well as a descriptive one: not only are consumer confusion and territoriality actually intertwined, but also, the courts that separate the two are incorrect in doing so. 80 
B. Confusion and Dawn Donut
This mistake is not isolated to common law marks-it is pervasive under the Lanham Act as well. Because the Lanham Act grants mark holders nationwide constructive use, territoriality under federal law most commonly comes into play when courts are issuing injunctions. In other words, it is most relevant when Dawn Donut rears its head. Because Dawn Donut permits injunctions only when two marks are used in "distinct and separate markets," the doctrine seems to be concerned only with geography, not confusion. Yet, like concurrent use at common law, this distinction is illusory. As before, the motivation behind Dawn Donut is consumer 77. Best Cellars, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 84 (citing United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100 (1918) ) ("Once the court identifies a situation wherein the junior user actually possesses superior rights in the relevant market area, the final issue is whether the 'second comer's' actions cause a likelihood of confusion.").
80. See infra Section III.
confusion, not geographical penetration. This motivation is readily found in the case of Dawn Donut and in the cases that have followed.
In Dawn Donut, the court justified its decision by remarking that "no public confusion is likely" so long as the plaintiff and defendant confined their uses of the mark "Dawn" to separate trading areas. 81 And if this was not clear enough, the court explicitly held that when the use is confined to distinct and separate markets, with no likelihood of expansion, "there is no likelihood of public confusion arising from the concurrent use of the marks and therefore the issuance of an injunction is not warranted." 82 Thus, the court tied the denial of injunctive relief directly to the fact that there was no likelihood of confusion. If there was a likelihood of confusion, it is doubtful that the court would have denied the injunction. As such, this was not a case about geography; it was a case about consumer awareness. At the time Dawn Donut was decided, distance was often a proxy for awareness. This is evidenced by the fact that many courts have read Dawn Donut to be a doctrine about consumer confusion. 83 At least three circuit courts have made claims to this effect. First, while discussing the Dawn Donut rule, the Fifth Circuit held that a user cannot not enjoin another if "the likelihood of confusion between his product and the infringer's is minimal or nonexistent, such as where the parties to the action use the mark in totally different markets, or for different products." 84 1, 1975) ("Where there is no present likelihood that plaintiff will expand its use into defendant's territorial market place, as is the case here, and where the unauthorized use of a conflicting mark is confined to a sufficiently distinct and geographically separate market by the junior user, there may be no present likelihood of public confusion." (citing Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 364)).
84. Union Nat'l Bank v. Union Nat'l Bank, 909 F.2d 839, 843 (5th Cir. 1990 ); see also Golden Flake, 312 F.2d at 626 (stating that Dawn Donut is premised "on the necessity of showing likelihood of confusion.").
"present likelihood of confusion." 85 Finally, the Ninth Circuit invoked Dawn Donut to affirm the denial of an injunction only because it found that there was no likelihood of confusion. 86 However, the court indicated that it would not deny an injunction if the plaintiff could show a "likelihood of public confusion," despite the geographic distance between the two uses. 87 Thus, in all three cases, the courts applied Dawn Donut with an eye to consumer confusion.
Of course, this might indicate that there is no issue to be resolved and that this paper is useless. After all, if courts are conditioning injunctive relief on confusion, then the doctrine appears to recognize the geographyconfusion overlap and thus does not need a fix. However, courts applying Dawn Donut often forget that confusion is the underlying concern and instead rigidly apply the geographic rule handed down when the doctrine was created. For example, see the case of Johnson v. Sosebee. 88 There, the court did discuss confusion in the context of an injunction, but ultimately concluded that "there is no likely confusion for a court to enjoin unless and until the senior user shows a likelihood of entry into the junior user's trade territory." 89 Thus, the court refused to protect a trademark in areas that the plaintiff had not actually penetrated, or was likely to penetrate, even if the plaintiff had acquired a reputation in that area without a physical presence. 90 Some courts do not believe that is a risk in the rigid application of Dawn Donut because they do not think that consumer confusion is possible in geographically distinct markets. 91 260, 262 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief when the defendant used the mark in a distinct geographic region because there was no risk of public confusion).
86. Continente v. Continente, 378 F.2d 279, 282 (9th Cir. 1967 especially in light of the Internet and mass travel. Perhaps it is this conception of Dawn Donut that has caused the Sixth Circuit to reject the doctrine entirely and focus its inquiry solely on consumer confusion. 92 In the Sixth Circuit, a plaintiff need only show likelihood of confusion in a particular area to enjoin the defendant's use there, regardless of whether the plaintiff has actually made use of the mark in that territory. 93 Concurring in the opinion, Judge Jones argued that the mobility of modern society coupled with the Internet has eroded geographical barriers and rendered Dawn Donut irrelevant. 94 And just a few years later, the court reiterated that when a court is determining territorial rights, it should rely on the underlying goal of eliminating consumer confusion. 95 Over a decade later, the First Circuit appeared to support this view in Dorpan S. L. v. Hotel Meliá, Inc. 96 In Dorpan, the First Circuit held that the area of a mark's use is defined as the area where the mark would create a likelihood of confusion, and thus an inquiry of geographic scope and an inquiry of confusion are "one and the same." 97 Despite these steps in the right direction, plenty of courts continue to separate geographic from consumer awareness. The next section will discuss the problems that arise when geographic distance is taken as an end-all-beall and is separated from a confusion inquiry.
III. WHEN CONFUSION IS FORGOTTEN
There are actual harms imposed on consumers when courts ignore the geography-confusion synthesis: consumers are likely to be confused. At first glance, this may seem like a circular argument. After all, it would be fallacious to argue that confusion is vital for the sole reason that ignoring confusion will cause confusion. But there is an important distinction that must be made. Whether or not one accepts the premise that confusion underlies territoriality, it is widely accepted that one of the broader goals of 92. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. CarMax, Inc., 165 F.3d 1047 , 1056 (6th Cir. 1999 trademark law as a whole is to prevent consumer confusion. 98 Because of this, if a doctrine in trademark law increases the chance of confusion, then this would seem to frustrate the very goals of trademark law itself. This section will attempt to show that a trademark territoriality doctrine detached from confusion will frustrate a broader purpose of trademark law.
A. The Non-Territorial Internet
The First Circuit aptly noted that it was once the case that "confusingly similar trademarks could exist simultaneously in different geographical areas" without risk of consumer confusion, but the Internet "has drastically changed this situation." 99 That was in 2001, and the pace of change has not slowed. It is now typical for a company to have its website accessible from anywhere in the country. And in addition to having websites, companies are on Facebook, Twitter, Yelp, Groupon, Seamless, and so on. The First Circuit may have been concerned about individual websites, but consumer interaction with trademarks has moved far beyond a company's website.
Consider the case of a junior user operating a restaurant with a name identical to a senior user's restaurant in a geographically remote location. If the senior mark is unregistered, and the junior use is in good faith, then common law territoriality focusing on market penetration alone will permit this use. In contrast, if the senior mark is registered, then a court using the solely geographical Dawn Donut will prevent the senior user from enjoining the junior user, assuming there is no likelihood of expansion. Now, imagine a consumer in Portland, Oregon, who has learned about a restaurant named "Toro Bravo" and is considering eating dinner there. This consumer may look on Yelp and find that an identically named "Toro Bravo" in Seattle has only a two-star rating. This rating may influence the decision of the Portland consumer. In one study, Michael Luca has found evidence that ratings on Yelp have a direct effect on a restaurant's revenue. A rating increase of one star appears to increase revenue by 5-9 percent. 100 consumer decision-making. As such, there is a chance that a low-rated restaurant with a name identical name to the one in Portland could confuse the consumer and alter her purchasing decisions, although one restaurant is in a different city. 101 The Portland consumer could fail to notice that the Seattle restaurant is a Seattle restaurant and not the one in Portland, or the Portland consumer could assume that they have the same owner and thus the rating of one might bear on the quality of the other. In either case, the Portland consumer may miss out on a good meal, and the Portland restaurant could miss out on a customer. Alternatively, in a mirrored state of affairs, the Portland consumer may pay for a lousy meal due to her confusion on Yelp.
In the case of restaurants, courts have taken note of online uses like this one when assessing likelihood of confusion. One court found that the presence of two similar marks on Yelp was significant for the common "marketing channels" prong of the likelihood of confusion analysis because such advertising efforts were "highly probative of whether the mark creates a likelihood of confusion." 102 Another court looked to a restaurant's Facebook efforts for this analysis as well. 103 In addition to marketing channels, one court found that mistaken restaurant Yelp reviews are admissible evidence of actual confusion. 104 And beyond the world of restaurants, various courts have taken note of Internet presence in multiple ways in their confusion analysis, including advertising methods, actual confusion, intent, and marketing channels. 105 Additionally, when it comes to assessing secondary meaning of a mark, courts will also use Internet presence in various ways. 106 The presence of a Yelp or a Facebook page has often played a less prominent role when it comes to determining territorial rights. 107 For example, take the common law territory analysis in Dudley v. HealthSource Chiropractic, Inc., in which a court in the Western District of New York failed to appreciate the fact that Facebook and Google searches returned potentially confusing results. 108 This fact was discussed in the Lanham Act infringement analysis, but when it came to the common law discussion, the court only addressed the Internet insofar as it concluded that the plaintiff could not have exclusive rights to Internet use. 109 Thus, had the plaintiff in Dudley not registered its mark, the court could have foregone a likelihood of confusion analysis entirely after concluding that the uses were remote. This outcome would be unacceptable, especially because both marks were used on the Internet.
In the similar case of Brothers of the Wheel M.C. Executive Council, Inc. v. Mollohan, a court in the Southern District of Western Virginia limited the scope of injunctive geographic areas actually penetrated by the plaintiff, in supposed accordance with Dawn Donut. 110 But before discussing market penetration, the court noted that the defendant operated a Facebook page that displayed the disputed name and logo. 111 Despite this, the court ultimately ordered that the defendant only cease use within areas physically penetrated by the plaintiff, ignoring all Internet use. Thus, the problem with Dudley plagued Mollohan as well, albeit in the context of a federally registered mark. In either case, an entire class of confused plaintiffs may potentially have been ignored due to the restricted nature of the territoriality analysis. This is not to say that no court considers Internet presence in its territoriality analysis. Consider the case of Guthrie Healthcare Systems v. ContextMedia in the Second Circuit. 112 In Guthrie, the court reviewed a district court's injunction and found that it was in error because the injunction permitted the defendant to continue using its mark within Guthrie's service area. 113 Specifically, the defendant could keep using the mark on the Internet. The Second Circuit reasoned that because the defendant's webpages were accessible within the scope of the plaintiff's geographic territory, confusion in these areas was likely. 114 Yet the court did not determine how the injunction should be tailored to fix this problem-it left that to the district court on remand. 115 Nevertheless, the court recognized the potential for a mark on the Internet mark to confuse, even without a physical presence. 116 In Guthrie, the court was likely influenced by the fact that the defendant operated near the plaintiff. After all, the court found that this geographic proximity supported a likelihood of confusion. 117 However, at least one court has found that the Internet generated a likelihood of confusion despite a lack of geographic proximity. In Baskim Holdings, Inc. v. Two M, Inc., a court in the District of Nevada found a genuine issue of fact as to whether businesses in New Orleans and Las Vegas were actually remote.
118 Even though the businesses were located in different cities, the court noted the identical names and services, coupled with the fact that both had websites and a social media presence. 119 Although Baskim may seem unique, the holding is 112. Guthrie Healthcare Sys. v. ContextMedia, Inc., 826 F.3d 27, 47 (2d Cir. 2016). 113. Id. 114. Id. 115. Id. at 50. 116 . In this particular case, there was a physical presence, id. at 39-40, but there is no reason to read the court's holding as applying only to such cases. The concern was about Internet presence that could be accessed within the plaintiff's territory; it did not rely on the defendant physically being present as well.
Id.
117 2013) . There, the court refused to apply Dawn Donut because, inter alia, the senior user had a large Internet presence and made sales across the country. Id. I call this "more subtle" because the amount of sales in the area in question seemed unsurprising once one notices the court's explicit statement that consumer confusion is the "touchstone" of concurrent use. 120 With this axiom of territoriality explicitly recognized, there was no reason for the court to find that geographic proximity is necessary for confusion. After all, the internet does not discriminate on the basis of distance. When a court fails to take this fact into account, there is always a risk that consumer confusion will fly under the radar.
B. A World of Travel
It bears repeating that Dawn Donut was focused on consumer confusion, or more precisely, the lack thereof. 121 As discussed above, the Second Circuit explicitly stated that "no public confusion is possible" when marks are used in two geographically distinct markets. 122 Of course, this assertion no longer holds true in the age of the Internet. But the Internet is just one of many massive societal changes that have occurred since Dawn Donut. Also, the frequency of consumer travel has skyrocketed, completely altering consumer exposure to geographically distant marks. In the year after Dawn Donut was decided, airlines carried a total of 57.9 million passengers. 123 By 2017, that number had risen to 741.7 million for domestic passengers alone-an increase of almost 1300 percent. 124 The Second Circuit recognized this fact in Brennan 's, Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurant, LLC. 125 In analyzing likelihood of confusion, the court stated that because establishments like hotels and restaurants attract the traveling public, "even businesses that are separated by large distances may attract overlapping clientele due to the ease of travel," and thus geographical distance does not negate the possibility of confusion. 126 Nevertheless, the court qualified this to play a large role in the court's holding. Id. This is unlike in Baskim where there were no sales in the junior user's territory. Baskim, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156752, at *10-11. 120. 2017 -2018 - -us-airline-traffic-data. 125. 360 F.3d 125, 135 (2d Cir. 2004 ) ("Certain businesses such as hotels, and to a lesser degree restaurants, attract the traveling public."). Because the court was reviewing a preliminary injunction, it was looking to likelihood of success on the merits and thus reviewed the mark's distinctiveness, id. at 130-31 This is slightly different than an injunction analysis intertwined with the infringement analysis, as was the case in Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 365. Nevertheless, the court's comments regarding the interplay of geography and confusion are worth discussing, Brennan 's, claim by noting that "substantial geographic separation remains a significant indicator that the likelihood of confusion is slight." 127 This qualification aligns with the interplay of confusion and territoriality. Geographic distance might make confusion less likely, but it certainly does not negate the possibility of confusion. David Barrett has argued that the law should offer greater territorial protections for marks that are associated with companies serving traveling consumers-namely hotels and restaurants. 128 This argument aligns well with the court's analysis in Brennan's: geographic distance does not dispel confusion for perambulating consumers who travel from region to region. Along these lines, other courts have recognized the issue of traveling customers and have allowed the senior user to enjoin a junior user despite geographically remote operations. In the case of Gastown, Inc. v. Gastown, Inc., a district court in Connecticut dealt with two gas stations operating under identical names. 129 The defendant argued Dawn Donut barred an injunction because the closest use of the two marks was 443 miles apart. 130 The court noted, however, that some major service stations, distant as they may have been, were still placed along the same highway. 131 Additionally, the court reasoned that it was not uncommon for a motorist "to drive from Hartford, Springfield, or Boston to Cleveland or Detroit in a single day over interstate super-highways." 132 As such, the court concluded that there was a likelihood of confusion and thus found that the Dawn Donut defense was inapplicable. 133 Similarly, a district court in Colorado found that the plaintiff operating under the name "SuperShuttle" could enjoin the defendant from using the mark SUPERSHUTTLE EXPRESS in the Denver airport, although the plaintiff did not operate there. 134 First, the court did find that the plaintiff had 127. Id. (citing Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 364 shown that Denver was within its zone of natural expansion. 135 However, even if the plaintiff had not demonstrated this, the court was aware that "both parties provide services primarily to individuals traveling from one airport to another," and thus, the plaintiff would be unlikely to distinguish between the two uses, despite such uses being in "remote geographic regions." 136 On the other hand, some courts are less inclined to worry about traveling customers. The Fifth Circuit has held that "[c]oncurrent ownership of marks in separate geographical territories is clearly permissible" because the fact that "an occasional purchaser will travel between geographical districts is not a large enough problem to justify outlawing concurrent trademark ownership." 137 And the Third Circuit has not done much better. In the case of Holiday Inns of America v. B & B Corp. , the owner of HOLIDAY INN hotels sought to enjoin defendant's use of HOLIDAY INN on its hotels in the Virgin Islands. 138 The court initially seemed to be inclined to grant the traveling customer more protection by noting that "the development of today's mobile society" has frustrated older trademark concepts regarding restricted or local markets. 139 Nevertheless, the court denied the injunction until the plaintiff could show that it had actually entered the defendant's territory. 140 The court made this ruling despite also determining that the case involved an industry frequented by perambulating consumers and that there would almost certainly be confusion when the plaintiff entered the defendant's territory. 141 Thus, because the court remained fixated on geographic territory, it permitted the confusion that may befall the traveling consumer.
Holiday Inns perfectly demonstrates how concurrent use can go awry when courts fail to consider mobility. The court was entirely focused on the fact that Holiday Inns did not have a location in one specific area, despite 135. Id. at *9. 136. Id. at *9-10. 137. Ky. Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 387-88 (5th Cir. 1977 ). This quote was in regard to forfeiture due to unrestrained licensing, but the court made the claim to justify concurrent uses, and so it is nonetheless very relevant for our analysis, id. otherwise being a national chain with national advertising campaigns. 142 This fact alone might suggest that concurrent uses should not be allowed. Yet, most importantly, the case involved the hotel industry, whose very essence is tied to the traveling consumer. If concurrent uses are supposed to be permitted only when there is no likelihood of consumer confusion, then this is undermined when a court ignores the nature of the industry and the possibility of mobile consumers. Drawing these arbitrary borders will often frustrate the purpose of shielding consumers from confusion.
IV. THE UNIFYING POWER OF CONFUSION
As the previous section demonstrated, current territoriality doctrine struggles to account for societal advancements over the past few decades. Both concurrent use for common law marks and the Dawn Donut for registered marks fail to adequately protect consumers from possible confusion. But trademark law does not need an entire reformation. Instead, the territoriality issue can be entirely captured by the likelihood of confusion analysis. As discussed earlier, the remoteness inquiry at its core is meant to track consumer awareness. Because of this, there is no reason for a court to determine territorial rights and then move onto a separate infringement discussion. Consumer awareness, and thus remoteness, will be entirely captured by the infringement analysis.
This proposal immediately raises two potential technical issues to address before proceeding. First, one might be concerned that this synthesis would change the evidence required to demonstrate likelihood of confusion. However, no evidentiary overhaul is needed, because it is a factual issue to both determine a trademark's territory 143 and to evaluate likelihood of confusion. 144 Thus, any factual evidence that was once required to demonstrate territory will merely be shifted to the infringement inquiry. Second, one might worry about laches. If a trademark holder can acquire territorial rights in an area without using her mark there, then it is possible that the mark holder may not know the territorial extent of her rights. So, it may be possible that her rights are infringed in a particular area without her knowledge, and if she waits too long to sue due to this lack of knowledge, the doctrine of laches might bar her suit. However, the Fourth Circuit's conception of laches obviates this concern by placing no obligation to sue on a mark holder until the "likelihood of confusion looms large." 145 Thus, the plaintiff is barred only if she has "unreasonably delayed" her pursuit of a remedy. 146 As such, it is doubtful that a court will consider a plaintiff to have unreasonably delayed its pursuit of a remedy if she was unaware that she had such a right. Only when she becomes aware of her rights in an area will the laches clock begin to run.
With these technical issues resolved, the following sections will detail how the likelihood of confusion analysis nearly encompasses trademark. First, the paper will turn to the common law doctrine to see how this incorporation plays out. Then, with this backdrop, the paper will move to federal law, advocating for the abolition of Dawn Donut in a world of synthesized territoriality and confusion.
A. The Common Law Solution
Because federal registration is the prevalent norm, one might wonder what role common law marks still play in trademark law. As it turns out, common law marks still play an important role. Although many businesses do register their marks, there are specific industries that frequently do not resort to federal registration. The restaurant industry is one such group. This fact is particularly important for our purposes because restaurants often have an internet presence (due to services like Yelp and Seamless) and are common destinations for travelers.
Common law marks are still prevalent in the restaurant industry. To demonstrate this, the names of restaurants from four major U.S. were searched using the Trademark Electronic Search System to determine which a question of fact, but the court may grant summary judgment in appropriate circumstances."); see also Tana v. Dantanna's, 611 F.3d 767, 775 n.7 (11th Cir. 2010) ("Although likelihood of confusion is a question of fact, it may be decided as a matter of law.").
145. Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 462 (4th Cir. 1996 ) (citing MCCARTHY, supra note 22, at § 31.06 (2)(c) that it is not uncommon for a restaurant to forego registering its mark. As such, common law marks continue to play a role in trademark law.
This focus on restaurants may lead one to conclude that the concurrent use doctrine at common law does not need total reformation. Instead, perhaps restaurants could have a unique territoriality doctrine. But this would be misguided. The problems identified in previous sections are not unique to restaurants. After all, restaurants are not the only industries that have perambulating customers. Should the occasional gas station or hotel that utilizes a common law mark use this special territoriality doctrine? And although federal registration is standard, it is incredibly likely that Internet users will encounter common law marks while online.
For the sake of parsimony, and to avoid creating an under-inclusive test, territoriality should be applied uniformly for all types of marks. This means that the common law concurrent use doctrine must be reformed to account for the Internet and mass travel. In what follows, the paper argues that this reform does not require any new tests. Instead, the territoriality analysis should be entirely subsumed by the likelihood of confusion test. Both remoteness (zone of goodwill and natural expansion) and good faith can be wholly captured by the factors in the likelihood of confusion test.
Remoteness a. Zone of Actual Goodwill
Recall that the remoteness inquiry at common law focuses on the zone of actual goodwill, which is divided into two subclasses: market penetration and reputation. As discussed before, the zone of market penetration has four commonly-used factors (1) amount of sales involving the trademark; (2) positive and negative growth trends in the geographical area; (3) the number of purchasing customers in relation to the total number of potential customers; and (4) amount of advertising in the geographical area. 153 The major flaw with this test is that it is unequipped to deal with confusion caused by the Internet and perambulating customers. The zone of reputation, on the other hand, is well-suited for these phenomena because it does not arbitrarily draw lines based on geography. Instead, the zone of reputation is meant to align entirely with areas where a sufficient number of consumers recognize the mark. That is, it attempts to locate the areas where consumers may be 153. Nat. Footwear, Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383 , 1398 -99 (3d Cir. 1985 . The Natural Footwear factors have been endorsed by multiple other circuits. See, e.g., Allard Enters. v. Advanced Programming Res., Inc., 249 F.3d 564, 574 (6th Cir. 2001) ; Adray v. Adry-Mart, Inc., 76 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir. 1995); Spartan Food Sys. v. HFS Corp., 813 F.2d 1279 , 1283 (4th Cir. 1987 confused, not just those areas where the mark is used. Thus, the zone of reputation is crucial for adequately evaluating confusion.
Initially, it may seem difficult to determine the extent of a reputational zone without reference to actual sales. As such, courts have attempted to set out concrete factors to determine the scope of such a zone. For example, the Southern District of Florida set out a few valuable factors in Popular Bank v. Banco Popular. 154 The case involved two banks. One operated entirely in Miami, Florida, and the other began operations in Puerto Rico, eventually spreading its advertisements and operations to several parts of Florida, including Miami. 155 Banco Popular argued that it had territorial rights in Southern Florida-even in places where it did not have banks-due to its reputation in the area. To analyze this, the court devised three factors for determining whether reputation without sales could establish trademark rights in an area, looking at the amount of (1) advertising in the area, (2) goods bearing the mark that are transported into the territory, and (3) customers in the territory that visit the business. 156 These factors make intuitive sense, and they attempt to address at least one problem with territoriality, namely the perambulating customer.
Yet, courts have yet to flesh-out an adequate test for dealing with the Internet, either under the zone of reputation or penetration. W. Scott Creasman has suggested that courts ought to merge both penetration and reputation into a five-factor test when analyzing Internet marks (1) volume of internet sales, (2) growth trends, (3) sales as a function of the total market, (4) distribution of sales points, and (5) specific targeting, including brickand-mortar advertising. 157 However, as Shontavia Johnson has pointed out, Creasman does not consider the number of visitors to the mark holder's websites nor the amount of money spent on Internet marketing tools. 158 Thus, in response, Johnson has proposed a test that asks a single underlying question: has there been trademark use or penetration sufficient to create a lasting impression in the consumer's mind in the relevant geographical region? 159 To determine this, Johnson suggests applying Creasman's five factors, coupled with four more (6) type and amount of Internet advertising, 154. 9 F. Supp. 2d 1347 , 1355 (S.D Fla. 1998 (7) length and manner of presence on the Internet, (8) the purpose and character of the internet presence, and (9) the number of unique monthly Internet visitors. 160 The creation of a new multi-factor test for territoriality on the Internet is entirely unnecessary. Johnson defends the use of this seemingly unwieldy nine-factor test by pointing out that trademark law has plenty of multi-factor tests, such as the eight-plus factor infringement test. 161 Fair enough. But I propose an even simpler solution: forget all these tests for territoriality and simply use the multi-factor infringement test. In analyzing infringement, courts commonly look to several factors (1) the similarity of the marks, (2) defendant's intent, (3) actual confusion, (4) proximity of the goods (i.e., the similarity of the goods/services), (5) strength of the plaintiff's mark, (6) consumer sophistication, (7) likelihood of bridging the gap (how likely the plaintiff is to enter the defendant's market), and (8) comparative quality of the goods. 162 Different circuits take different approaches to consumer confusion, but all utilize factors similar to the these. 163 One additional prong considered by multiple other circuits is especially vital to our analysis (9) similarity of advertising methods 164 or marketing channels. 165 Three of these infringement factors align with the zones of penetration or reputation: marketing channels, advertising channels, and evidence of actual confusion. Together, these three factors look to where the product is sold, advertised, and recognized by consumers. These elements sufficiently capture the thrust of both the zones of penetration and reputation, even if some aspects of the territoriality tests left behind. For example, the likelihood of confusion test does not compare the number of sales to the size of the market, as is done in the penetration analysis. Nor does it weigh the number of monthly visitors to a website, which Johnson proposed for her Internet test. But if avoiding confusion is the end-goal of trademark law, then these factors are unnecessary. Consider this: if mark P and mark Q look entirely different, are sold in entirely different markets, and are advertised through entirely different marketing channels, what is the purpose of determining what percentage of a specific territory buys P in relation to the territory's total population? In the end, if there is no likelihood of confusion, then the number of sales is meaningless because P and Q can coexist. 166 Thus, the zones of penetration and reputation do not require any extensive territorial inquiries that are not already covered by the likelihood of confusion analysis.
b. Zone of Natural Expansion
The zones of penetration and reputation may be accounted for, but the infringement analysis must also account for the zone of natural expansion to satisfy remoteness. Recall that there are multiple tests for expansion, but a common one embraced by multiple circuits looks to (1) the mark holder's previous business activity, (2) any previous expansions or lack thereof, (3) contiguousness of expansion areas, (4) presently-planned expansions, and (5) whether products are brought into the supposed expansion area from other regions. 167 The zone of natural expansion differs from penetration and reputation in that it does not attempt to identify present confusion, but instead future confusion. Initially, then, it may seem as though the likelihood of confusion test cannot capture the purpose of natural expansion. Luckily, the infringement analysis set out in Polaroid can deal with this issue in its "bridging the gap" factor.
Bridging the gap refers to a situation where the "senior user presently intends to expand his sales efforts to compete directly with the junior user." 168 The Southern District of New York has indicated that it protects the senior user's interest in "preserving avenues of expansion and entering into related fields." 169 In the past, courts seemed to be less concerned with geographic distance, and more concerned about "competitive distance" when it comes to likelihood of bridging the gap. 170 This focus on competitive distance would deal with concerns about consumer confusion. If a mark is not competitively proximate to another mark, either by market or geography, then two consumers are not likely to be confused. However, if a mark may soon become competitive with another mark, then this is something that must be taken into account. The "bridging the gap" factor deals with this issue by looking to whether two marks will become competitively proximate.
To be sure, "bridging the gap" most commonly refers to market distance, not geographic reach, unlike the zone of natural expansion. However, as discussed above, geography is merely a proxy for consumer awareness. As long as bridging the gap captures a likelihood of future confusion, then it has served the underlying purpose of territoriality.
If one believes that territorial expansion ought to be accounted for, then courts need to only slightly alter the factor to align with the Second Circuit. In the Second Circuit, "bridging the gap" becomes important when the junior user shows that the senior operates in either "a different field of enterprise or a different geographic area." 171 By framing the inquiry in this way, the Second Circuit has explicitly recognized that "bridging the gap" can be used to look at future market expansion or geographic expansion. Although this conception of "bridging the gap" may not yet be embraced by every circuit, it has the potential to capture the purpose of the zone of natural expansion. If other courts adopt a conception of "bridging the gap" that includes future expansions to a geographic area, then the zone of natural expansion can be completely captured by this factor of the infringement test. But even if courts do not shift their conception of "bridging the gap," then the zone of natural expansion is still tested by an analysis of future market moves. This inquiry tests potential consumer awareness, which is the motivating force behind the zone of natural expansion.
Good Faith
For the infringement analysis to completely supplant common law territoriality, it must also account for the good faith prong, i.e., the second requirement of concurrent use. 172 Like above, this requirement is completely captured by the likelihood of confusion analysis-this time by the "defendant's intent" factor. Courts have held that this factor of the confusion analysis looks to the defendant's "intent to confuse or deceive consumers as to the product's source" 173 or to the defendant's intent to capitalize on the plaintiff's reputation and goodwill. 174 The good faith requirement of territoriality varies across jurisdictions. Multiple circuits have taken the requirement of good faith to mean that the junior user must not have any knowledge of the senior user's mark. 175 This understanding seems to suggest that in such jurisdictions, a junior user jeopardizes her good faith by merely doing a Google search of a mark before its adoption. 176 In contrast, other courts have held that mere knowledge is insufficient to destroy good faith. 177 For example, the Tenth Circuit has emphasized that although a junior user's subsequent adoption of a mark with knowledge of the senior user's mark "can certainly support an inference of bad faith, mere knowledge should not foreclose further inquiry." 178 Instead, good faith hinges on "whether the second user had the intent to benefit from the reputation or goodwill of the first user." 179 This approach more closely resembles the intent inquiry within the likelihood of confusion analysis.
Although some circuits hold that intent to copy is sufficient to infer likelihood of confusion in the infringement analysis, 180 an overwhelming majority of circuits do not think that a defendant's knowledge alone is sufficient for such an inference. 181 Thus, because confusion underlies territoriality, the courts that currently apply a knowledge standard for good faith in the territoriality analysis are misguided. After all, in the actual confusion analysis, a majority of courts do not accept that knowledge entails confusion. And this makes sense. The mere fact that the junior user knew of the senior user's mark says nothing about consumer confusion.
In response, proponents of the knowledge standard assert that confusion can be presumed if the junior user knew of the senior user's mark. 182 But as Thomas Cotter has pointed out, there seems to be little reason to accept this claim without evidence that the junior user's knowledge bears a meaningful correlation to consumer knowledge. 183 This is because the intent factor is ultimately grounded in the likelihood of consumer confusion, like the rest of infringement analysis. 184 To this end, the Third Circuit has even held that an explicit intent to copy is not alone sufficient to infer confusion. 185 Confusion can only be inferred if the intent to confuse is "demonstrated via purposeful manipulation of the junior mark to resemble the senior's." 186 Because knowledge does not entail confusion, and because the touchstone of territoriality is consumer awareness, then mere knowledge should not bar a finding good faith for concurrent use. This means that the likelihood of confusion analysis will completely capture the good faith requirement of concurrent use, even in those jurisdictions that adopt a knowledge standard for good faith. Such jurisdictions have become disconnected from the purpose of the doctrine: to protect consumers from confusion. Because the intent factor in the infringement analysis concerns itself with consumer confusion, that factor is wholly sufficient to capture the good faith requirement of Theodore Rectanus.
In sum, both the remoteness and good faith prong of concurrent use can be captured by the likelihood of confusion analysis. Thus, applying a separate test for common law territoriality is entirely unnecessary, and such tests should be discarded. That is not the end of the argument, however. The final section shows that territorial limitations under federal law must be discarded as well.
B. Farewell, Dawn Donut
In a regime of nationwide constructive use, a trademark holder's territorial rights are not segmented as they would be common law since her territorial rights become national upon registration. Nevertheless, as the reader will recall, territorial barriers are not entirely absent with federallyregistered marks. The doctrine of Dawn Donut can prevent injunctive relief notwithstanding the senior's national rights, thus causing the same pitfalls that are present in the common law territoriality doctrine. Internet users and perambulating customers do not cease to exist once a mark has been registered federally. Because of this, it is crucial that courts determine the scope of injunctions in reference to consumer confusion and do not adopt a misguided requirement of physical presence. In other words, courts must condition injunctions on consumer confusion, not territorial proximity, thus eliminating Dawn Donut.
The decision to discard Dawn Donut is not novel. As mentioned in the introductory section on Dawn Donut, the Sixth Circuit has altogether rejected the doctrine. There, courts begin their inquiry by determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion at all. 187 If infringement is found, and there are no applicable defenses, then an injunction is permitted without any territorial inquiry because "no particular finding of likelihood of entry" is required for an injunction. 188 Thus, by rejecting Dawn Donut, the Sixth Circuit blends the likelihood of confusion analysis with that of territoriality: if the junior's use has created a likelihood of confusion in a particular area, 187. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Amouri's Grand Foods, Inc., 453 F.3d 377, 380-81 (6th Cir. 2006 ). 188. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. CarMax, Inc., 165 F.3d 1047 , 1056 (6th Cir. 1999 then the senior user may obtain injunctive relief in that area, and thus has territorial rights there. 189 In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Carmax, Judge Jones wrote in a concurrence that Dawn Donut does not override the confusion inquiry because the likelihood of entry into a market is but one factor in the analysis. 190 The Middle District of Pennsylvania took this same approach in Members First Federal Credit Union v. Members 1st Fed. Credit Union, when the court refused to "supplant" the ten-factor likelihood of confusion test with Dawn Donut. 191 The court in Members First was right to use the word "supplant." By applying Dawn Donut, courts override any determination of confusion just because of geographical distance, thereby supplanting the entire confusion inquiry. Perhaps this was appropriate when confusion was unlikely due to distance, but as has been shown, this can no longer be presumed in light of the Internet and mass travel.
It seems that the Second Circuit-the court that originally devised the Dawn Donut rule-has partially rethought its stance on territoriality as well. Return to the case of Guthrie discussed earlier for its take on the Internet. 192 The plaintiff, Guthrie, owned and operated various medical facilities and specialized healthcare facilities, primarily within Northern Pennsylvania and Southern New York (deemed Guthrie's "service area"). 193 The defendant, ContextMedia, delivered health-related content to physician practices in all fifty states. 194 The district court held that ContextMedia's mark was confusingly similar to Guthrie's, and enjoined ContextMedia's use in Guthrie's service area. 195 But no injunction issued for locations outside of Guthrie's service area because the court found that there was no likelihood of confusion, although Guthrie maintained patient treatment facilities in two New York counties beyond its service area. 196 The Second Circuit reversed, holding that a senior user who has shown that she is entitled to an injunction in one geographic territory need not show the same probability of harm in every further area into which the injunction might extend. 197 Instead, the senior user "must show evidence of plausibly foreseeable confusion beyond its main area of injury." 198 This analysis will turn on a case's "particular facts," but the court in Guthrie found that the plaintiff had met this burden. Thus, once a plaintiff has demonstrated likelihood of confusion in one area, the Second Circuit will not require a showing of likelihood of confusion for all other areas. The injunction will be denied only if the junior user can affirmatively show that there is no likelihood of confusion in a particular area. 199 In one respect, this case simply sets up a presumption of confusion in all areas where the senior user operates if the senior has shown a likelihood of confusion in one area. Moreover, this case can be read to mean that an injunction can be issued wherever the senior can demonstrate some "plausibly foreseeable confusion." Understood this way, the rigidity of Dawn Donut would be bent to the breaking point.
Although these courts are all correct to weaken or reject Dawn Donut, it is crucial that the holdings do not become too detached from consumer confusion. For example, the court in Guthrie concluded that when a senior user shows likelihood of confusion in territory A, she need not undergo the same in-depth confusion analysis for territory B to get an injunction. 200 The facts of Guthrie undoubtedly helped shape this rule, for the senior user had an actual presence in territory B as well as A in the case. Yet, in cases like CarMax, the court seemed to indicate that an injunction can follow from a demonstration of likelihood of confusion in the abstract, and confusion did not need to be shown in a particular area. 201 However, likelihood of confusion must remain critical to the territory analysis. If a senior user has demonstrated a likelihood of confusion in territory A but has no presence in territory B, then the burden must remain on the senior user to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion in territory B before she can receive an injunction. 202 The purpose of this paper is not to eliminate concurrent use. After all, there is evidence that the number of good trademarks is limited-and we are running out. 203 The choice between adopting Dawn Donut and granting mark holders nationwide injunctive rights is not binary. Trademark rights, and the subsequent right to enjoin others, must always be grounded in avoiding consumer confusion.
At first glance, it may seem overly burdensome to require a senior user to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion in every area where the junior user makes use of the mark. However, this is not as arduous as it may appear. After all, most of the likelihood of confusion factors will not need to be repeated for each location. For example, similarity of the marks, defendant's intent, consumer sophistication, and strength of the mark can all be done once. Only actual confusion, likelihood of bridging the gap, and advertising/marketing channels will need to be repeated for different regions. But, under the old territoriality regime, this must be done as well. At common law, courts would need to conduct a remoteness analysis for every area at issue. Thus, the territory-infringement synthesis would be no additional work for common law marks.
To be sure, the CarMax and Guthrie approach would be less work for courts than the synthesis, since injunctions could be issued everywhere after a finding of confusion in the abstract. Nevertheless, simple does not always mean better. One must remember that overprotection of intellectual property is just as harmful to the consumer as under-protection. 204 To serve the goals of trademark law, and prevent overprotection of trademark rights, courts must look at likelihood of confusion in each area of potential confusion, and enjoin use on that basis.
V. CONCLUSION
It was once unlikely that a consumer in New York would see a trademark being used in Seattle. However, the Internet and mass travel have pushed those days far behind us. Nevertheless, trademark law has yet to catch up with changing times. Both common law trademarks and federally registered trademarks suffer from pitfalls in the doctrine of territoriality, and thus both are due for some updating. But the law does not need a massive overhaul because the likelihood of confusion test provides all the necessary tools to combat the issues plaguing territoriality. The solution is incredibly simple: forget the stand-alone tests for territoriality and apply a likelihood of REV. 945, 947-48 (2018) .
204. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 , 1513 (9th Cir. 1993 ) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it.").
confusion analysis. If consumers in area A are likely to confuse marks P and Q, then only permit the senior user to use the mark in area A. There does not need to be a separate inquiry into the geographic distance between P and Q; this is but one factor among many in the infringement analysis. The incorporation of territoriality into the infringement test will both add analytic clarity and protect an entire swath of consumers from possible confusion. Thus, while trademark law is currently confused, it need only embrace confusion to sort itself out.
